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This study assesses the usefulness of conceptions of policy capacity for understanding policy 
and governance outcomes. In order to shed light on this issue, we revisit the concept of 
governance, derive a model of governance types and discuss their capacity pre-requisites. A 
model of capacity is developed combining competences or skills over three levels of activities 
with analysis of resource capabilities at each level. This analysis is then applied to common 
modes of  governance. While each mode requires all types of capacity if it is to be high 
functioning and match its theoretical optimal potential, most on-the-ground modes do not 
always attain their highest potential. Each mode has a critical type of capacity which serves 
as its “achilles heel‟. That is, without high levels of this specific capacity it is unlikely to 
perform as expected. While some hybrid modes can serve to supplement or reinforce each 
other and cover off gaps in critical capacity sectors other mixed forms may exacerbate single 
mode issues. Switching between modes or adopting hybrid modes is therefore a non-trivial 
issue in which considerations of capacity issues in general and Achilles heel capacities in 
particular should be a central concern. 
 
 
Introduction: Policy Capacity as the Achilles Heel of Governance 
Efforts at policy reform have been omnipresent in many developed and developing countries 
over the past several decades. Many of these efforts have featured waves of management 
reforms and administrative re-structuring, privatizations, de-regulation and re-regulation and 
the like (Ramesh and Howlett, 2006). ―Anything but the government‖, for example,  has been 
a popular sentiment in public policy reform for at least two decades (Christensen and 
Laegreid 2008).  
These reforms can often be characterized as efforts to shift governance styles between 
different modes of governing (Treib et al 2007). Initially, for example, the sentiment behind 
many reform efforts and coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s favoured transitions from 
government service delivery and regulation to more market-based types of governance 
regimes. Similarly in more recent years the tilt has shifted towards transitions from 
hierarchical and market forms of governance to more network-oriented governance 
relationships (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Lange et al 2013; Weber, Driessen and Runharr 
2011).  
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Even more recent efforts at reform in many countries and sectors have sought to 
correct for or reverse excesses in ‗de-governmentalization‘ from this era, often introducing 
hybrid elements into existing governance modes (Ramesh and Howlett 2006; Ramesh and 
Fritzen 2009). Many proponents, for example, claim ‗collaborative governance‘ combines the 
best of both government- and market-based arrangements by bringing together key public and 
private actors in a policy sector in a constructive and inexpensive way (Rhodes 1997).
1
 Many 
key sectors from health to education and elsewhere now feature elements of either or both 
hierarchical approaches – regulation, bureaucratic oversight and service delivery – as well as 
both market and network-based  hierarchical and non-hierarchical approaches such as 
markets, voluntary organizations, and increasingly co-production (Brandsen and Pestoff 
2006, Pestoff 2006 and 2012; Pestoff et al 2006).  
Not all of these reforms have been successful (Ling 2002) and whether and how well 
such different modes of governance perform, we argue, is based in large part on their 
capacity requirements or pre-conditions (Howlett 2009). That is, each form of governance 
requires a high level of state and actor capacity in order to function effectively (Bullock et al 
2001). Whether such capacity exists and how it is mobilized is a significant but little 
understood factor affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of any single governance mode 
(Canadian Government 1996). 
In order to shed light on this issue, we revisit the concept of governance, derive a 
model of governance types and discuss their capacity pre-requisites. A model of capacity is 
developed which combines competences or skills over three levels of activities with analysis 
of resource capabilities at each level. This analysis is then applied to each main mode of  
governance and hypotheses related to key capacity needs is set out. As the analysis will show, 
each mode requires all types of capacity if it is to be high functioning and match its 
theoretical optimal potential. However while most on-the-ground modes do not always attain 
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their highest potential, each mode has a critical type of capacity which serves as its ―achilles 
heel‖. That is, without high levels of this specific capacity it is unlikely to perform as 
expected. While some hybrid modes can serve to supplement or reinforce each other and 
cover off gaps in critical capacity sectors others mixed forms may exacerbate single mode 
issues. The consequences for policy making and governance reforms are then spelled out. 
 
Governance Modes in Theory and Practice: Ideal Types, Hybrid Forms and Their 
Performance 
 
Governing is what governments do: controlling the allocation of resources among social 
actors; providing a set of rules and operating a set of institutions setting out ‗who gets what, 
where, when, and how‘ in society; and managing the symbolic resources that are the basis of 
legitimacy (Lasswell 1958).  
In its broadest sense, ―governance‖ is a term used to describe the mode of government 
coordination exercised by state actors in their efforts to solve familiar problems of collective 
action inherent to government and governing (Rhodes, 1997; de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 
1995; Kooiman, 1993 and 2000; Majone 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). That is, 
„governance‟ is about establishing, promoting and supporting a specific type of relationship 
between governmental and non-governmental actors in the governing process. In modern 
capitalist societies this means managing relationships with businesses and civil society 
organizations also involved in the creation of public value and the delivery of goods and 
services to citizens (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Governance thus involves the establishment of a basic set of relationships between 
governments and their citizens. Although early models such as Pierre (2000), for example, 
distinguished between two only modes - state-centric ―old governance‖ and society-centric 
―new governance‖ – and many economists similarly compared and contrasted only two types 
of ―market‖ and ‗hierarchical‖ relationships (Williamson 1975) - even with just these three 
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basic sets of actors and relationships governance arrangements can take many shapes (Treib 
et al 2007). Other significant modes have been proposed by others such as Peters (1996), 
Considine and Lewis (1999), Newmann (2001), Kooiman (2003) and Cashore (2002) 
including types such as community-based ‗network‘ governance and pure ‗private‘ 
governance with little if no state involvement and which operate on ‗network‘ as opposed to 
hierarchical or market-based relationships. 
As Steurer (2013) suggested, the three basic governance actors can be portrayed as a 
interacting within a set of inter-related spheres of activity (see Figure 2) generating at least 
four ideal governance types (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Logic of Ideal Types of Governance after Steurer 
 












Beyond these ‗ideal types‘, however, other studies also identified a range of 
intermediate or ‗hybrid‘ governance modes or styles existing between the two ends of the 
state-society or state-market spectrums put forward by Pierre and Williamson (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2003; Rhodes 2007). Considine (2001) for example, proposed four ideal types of 
‗public‘ governance styles by distinguishing between ―legal‖ governance and ―corporatist‖ 
governance while including market governance and network governance ideal types in his 
model (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 – Ideal Type Modes of Governance following Considine 
Mode of 
Governance 
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Source: Modified from Considine (2001) 
 
Such distinctions proved useful in distinguishing between two different modes of 
state-centric governance found in European and Anglo-American systems. However the logic 
of hybridity is more extensive than put forward by Considine since different combinations of 
government, civil society and businesses exist and within a combination different sets of 
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actors have different ‗strengths‘. When variations on the strength of each actor in a 
governance relationship is included, this stretches to at least a dozen types (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 – Nuanced Model of  Modes of Governance Including Variation by Actor 
Strength 
 
This added complexity might appear at first glance to make it difficult to assess the 
nature of success and failure in each mode and this initial insight is largely correct. However, 
some simplifications can be made. First, as Cashore (2002) noted, pure non-governmental 
governance arrangements such as those found in certification and private standard setting 
schemes are not in the public realm and need not always concern governments and those 
studying governmental or ‗public‘ policy-making (see also Cutler et al 1999). Second, as 
Capano (2011) argued, in most cases of bilateral or trilateral governance arrangements the 
presence of hierarchy is overpowering and nuances pertaining to, for example, market and 

































arrangements where governments may be dominated by the presence of both market and 
network actors. That is, network and corporatist forms of governance modes exist as hybrids 
which are based on different mixes of coordination principles (hierarchy, market and 
network) (Meuleman 2010).  
Thus, as Howlett et al (2009) and Tollefson et al (2012) noted, the substance of 
difference between governance modes lies in their plurilateral or hierarchical nature and state 
or society-centric nature. How these two factors relate to the main types of public governance 
relationships described in Figure 3 is set out in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4 – Matrix of Typical Public Governance Modes by Central Actor and Mode of 
Co-ordination 
  Significance of State Role 
  Higher Lower 
Central mode of Co-
ordination of Actors 














As Figure 4 shows, government is not just one of the possible actors in a governance 
mode but is often the central player either potentially or actually, whether it chooses to play 
that role or not. Even in the more extreme horizontal or plurilateral arrangements governance 
modes need to be ‗steered‘ or led towards constructive, positive coordination. That is, the 
hierarchical government role in any governance arrangement may vary considerably, and 
change, but remains a core determinant and element of governance, rather than something 
existing in opposition to, or outside of, it. Government has the inescapable task of defining 
what governance is, or can be, and may choose to allow a higher degree of freedom to other 
policy actors with regard to the goals to be pursued and the means to be employed (Capano 
2011). 
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Hence the performance of any of the public governance modes set out in Figure 4 – 
that is, discounting the purely private forms outlines in Figure 1 -  is affected by the 
―governance capacity‖ that the central actor enjoys: that is, by governments ability to exercise 
its role in the level of co-ordination that governance mode entails. In those modes of 
governance which feature an extensive government presence, the nature of that government‘s 
ability to steer or control governance relationships is a critical component of that mode of 
governance‘s operation and propensity to fail. The government‘s capacity to make and 
implement policies in particular is thus a key requisite of the effective operation of any mode 
of governance (Wu and Ramesh 2014).  
At the extreme, for example, any effort to hollow out of ―central government‖ 
weakens the ability of a government to undertake a ―command and control‖ approach to 
policy-making and hence also undermines the ability of any legal or market form of 
governance dependent on such instruments to function effectively. Governments (conceived 
as central political institutions) may find themselves overburdened with economic problems 
or social demands so that ‗hierarchical governance‘ – that is, a policy framework  whereby 
the most important actors are governments and the state implements policies by ordering and 
sanctioning – may no longer prove  to be an efficient or effective form of governance. Hybrid 
corporatist and ‗network‘ governance modes in which the size and resources of the state 
typically greatly outreach those of other network actors and thus can continue to dominate 
those actors in any governance relationship also encounter such dynamics and public policy 
performance issues (Osborne 2006). 
 
Governance Modes and Their Propensity to Fail: Defining Actor Capabilities and 
Competences in Policy Capacity 
 
The policy capacity of a governance mode is hence a key indicator and requisite of 
governance success. The term describes the preconditions a government requires in order to 
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make sound policy choices and implement them effectively in achieving its potential to steer 
a governance mode. This is a broader definition than the widely-used  one offered by Painter 
and Pierre (2006) who focus their attention on capacity for policy formulation rather than 
both formulation and implementation in their definition of the term as: ―… the ability to 
marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective choices, in particular to set 
strategic directions, for the allocation of scarce resources to public ends.‖ Theirs is an unduly 
restrictive definition, as policy capacity is not only about the ability to formulate and make 
policy choices but also to implement them and evaluate their performance. 
Policy capacity is at heart a function of  three competences or skills which affect the 
ability of governments in their relationships with other governance actors: analytical ones 
which allow policy alternatives to be effectively generated and investigated; managerial ones 
which allow state resources to be effectively brought to bear on policy issues; and political 
ones which allow policy-makers and managers the room to manouevre and support required 
to develop and implement their ideas, programs and plans (Wu et al 2010; Tiernan and 
Wanna 2006; Gleeson et al 2009; Gleeson et al 2011; Fukuyama 2013; Rotberg 2014).  
These skills or competences are crucial to policy and governance success. However 
they also rely on the their availability and the availability of adequate resources to allow them 
to be mobilized. Resources or capabilities must exist at the individual level which allow 
individual policy workers (Colebatch 2006; Colebatch et al 2011) and managers (Howlett and 
Walker 2012) to participate in and contribute to designing, deploying, and evaluating 
policies. It includes not only their ability to analyse but also to learn and adapt to changes as 
necessary. Resources must also be available at the level of the organization. These are aspects 
of the structure and make-up of policy-relevant organizations that affect their members‘ 
ability to perform policy functions come. Organizational features that unduly circumscribe 
individual decision capabilities or morale among policy workers, for example, can undermine 
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an agency‘s ability to acquit its functions. The organizational conditions most relevant to 
policy capacity include those related to information, management, and political support 
(Tiernan and Wanna 2006;  Gleeson et al 2011). Finally, system level capabilities include the 
level of support and trust a public agency enjoys from its political masters and from the 
society at large (Blind 2006). Such factors are critical determinant of organizational 
capabilities and thus of public managers‘ capability to perform their policy functions. 
Political support for both from both above and below are vital because agencies and 
managers must be considered legitimate in order to access resources from their authorizing 
institutions and constituencies on a continuing basis, and such resources must also be 
available for award in the first place (Painter and Pierre 2005). 
 
Nine Specific Components of  Competence and Capabilities Integral to Policy Capacity 
The nine components of policy capacity involving these three sets of skills or competences 
and the three locations of resources or capabilities needed for their exercize are set out below. 
First dealing with analytical competences, governments must have the individuals with the 
ability to acquire and use and internal external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Ouimet et al. 2010) as well as (1) ―policy analytical capacity‖ which refers to the ability to 
access and apply technical and scientific knowledge and analytical techniques (Howlett, 
2009a; Riddell 1998). What governments do, indeed can do, and the likelihood of their 
success depend critically on their policy analytical skills in diagnosing problems and 
developing appropriate strategies for addressing them. Evidence-based policy making, for 
example, requires that agencies have the necessary absorptive capacity at the individual level, 
which refers to their ability to absorb and process information or evidence in recognizing, 
formulating, deciding upon, implementing and evaluating policy. Governments are often do 
not use evidence even when it is available due more to lack of skills rather than intention (UK 
Cabinet Office 1999; Grimshaw et al., 2012; Howlett, 2009). The lack of internal capacity in 
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this area cannot be easily offset by appointing external consultants because it requires 
considerable technical skills even to develop terms of reference for consultants, assess their 
output, and put them into practice (Howlett and Migone 2013). 
  They must also have  the (2) ‗organizational information capacity‘ to allow an 
effective information and policy analysis system, which plays a critical role in effective 
formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public policies, to operate (Tiernan 2011; 
Craft et al 2013). Analytical skills are especially important in the context of the present 
emphasis on evidence-based policy which requires not only the ability to analyze data but 
also its availability in a timely and systematic manner (Davies et al, 2000). An effective 
information systems can play a pivotal role in enhancing overall governance and policy 
capacity if properly designed and implemented. This refers to the architecture for collecting 
and disseminating information within and across public sector agencies. An effective 
information system for the policy development allows finding and sharing of information 
more quickly and provide for re-use of existing information without duplication of efforts. 
There is often a vast amount of information on policy experiences stored across countless 
sites in an organization that can offer insights into the range of policy options available and 
their real life consequences. Collating the information and making it accessible to other 
policy makers brings great benefits to governments at small cost  (Kwaterski 2010). A good 
system can also accelerate innovation as users connect and collaborate more easily and 
frequently and connect governments to people by facilitating popular input into the policy 
process and the delivery of public services (Moon et al 2014; Akeroyd 2009). 
Internally, information technology offers vast potential for improving integration and 
coordination within the public sector while enhancing the use of other analytical skills 
(Ambali, 2010). Another vital function for which ICT has tremendous potential is 
maintaining institutional memory within an organization and promoting policy learning. 
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Policy learning and policy emulation is a vital part of the policy-making and policy managers 
need broad understanding of the policy practices and their performance in other countries, 
agencies, and sectors (Huber 1991; May 1999).Increased emphasis on accountability, 
transparency, and participatory government has similarly accentuated the importance of 
information technology and the state of the knowledge system present in a jurisdiction or 
society (Oh 1997).  
At a larger level, the nature of the knowledge system in society or  (3) ―knowledge 
system capacity” is also a significant element of overall policy and governance capacity. This 
refers to the general state of educational and scientific facilities in a society, the availability, 
speed and ease of access generally to high quality information. Although many aspects of this 
type of capacity may be difficult to change or beyond the scope of individual government 
organizations and individual actors, they rely upon it implicitly and explicitly in order to 
perform their own analytical tasks effectively. 
Managerial competence is also a high priority if policy capacity is to be enhanced or 
exercized effectively. At the level of individual managers, (4) “managerial expertise 
capacity” or their ability to perform key managerial functions - such as planning, staffing, 
budgeting, and directing – is a vital determinant of the government‘s overall policy capacity 
(Howlett and Walker 2011; Hicklin and Godwin 2009). In a survey conducted by the 
National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (Zhang, Lee and Yang, 
2012), city and county managers reported the following as the most important individual 
competencies and management skills needed in local government):  
Communication skills;  
Leadership;  
Teamwork;  
Budgeting and Financial management.  
Decision-making and problem solving;  
Ethics and integrity 
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Communication skills in particular must also be available in abundance. Internally, 
organizations must communicate their goals, operational plans, and operating procedures to 
their employees and, no less importantly, must give the latter a say in shaping them (Kuipers 
et al 2013; Matland, 1995). Leadership appears high on the ranked list of skills for public 
managers not only in the above survey but also in similar surveys in Manitoba (2001) and 
New Zealand (State Services Commission 1999). Research shows that leadership is 
especially critical if groups are to assume new challenges and devise new strategies for 
meeting them.
2
 Developments in information technology have facilitated internal 
communication and augmented some aspects of managerial capacity but also pose new 
challenges, as mentioned in the preceding section. Modern managers also need a modicum of 
expertise in budgeting, accounting, and human resource management in order to perform 
effectively. These are skills that can be imparted by organizations and acquired by managers. 
There are established training programs of varying quality to train managers in principles of 
public sector accounting and skills in comprehending the balance sheet, cash flow statement, 
accrual accounting, and managerial cost accounting. 
As was the case with analytical competences, managerial capacity extends beyond 
individual skill sets, however, to the organizational and system-levels. At the organizational 
level, managers need (5) ―administrative resource capacity” in order to function effectively 
(Edwards 2009; Craft et al 2013). This is a well known aspect of capacity and comprises the 
funding and staffing levels within which managers work as well as the nature of intra- and 
inter-agency communication, consultation, and coordination (Peters 2001). At the system 
level, how well managers perform also depends on (6) “accountability and responsibility 
system capacity”, that is, how well they are trained and recruited, having career systems 
which promote competence and the presence of clear rules of law and engagement 
characteristic of Weberian administrative systems (Howlett 2004). 
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Necessary skills and competences go beyond the analytical and managerial to the 
level of political competences. In the public sector beyond leadership and negotiation skills, 
conflict resolution, and financial and human resources management, a key skill required of 
policy actors is political knowledge and experience or (7) “policy acumen capacity” (Wu et 
al 2011). This is a combination of what Head (2008) calls ‗political knowledge‘ and what 
Tenbensel (2008) termed ‗practical wisdom‘. Policy acumen allows policy managers to 
develop quick judgment on the desirability and feasibility of different policies: what will be 
considered feasible or acceptable by managers, politicians, stakeholders or the public, what 
will not, and why. A keen nose for politics not only within but also the broader environment 
is essential for policy actors to be able to play an effective role in the policy process. 
Identifying the key actors and understanding their essential interests and ideologies as well as 
the relationships among them are essential traits of successful public managers. So is an 
understanding of the political trade-offs necessary for an agreement among contending actors 
and interests. Understanding of the key stakeholders, their key interests, and their strategies 
and resources is a key component of the political acumen capacity on the part of individual 
policy actors. 
At the organizational level factors such as the existence of a good working 
relationship or ‗public service bargain‘ between ministers and the public service are central to 
(8) “organizational political capacity” and effective governance (Salmonsen and Knudsen 
2011). In principle, ministers are usually in charge of policy and the bureaucracy in charge of 
administration, although there is often no such clear distinction between the two roles in 
practice. Ministers need to remember that their function is to set directions and priorities and 
should not be involved in day-to-day operation. Involvement in their agencies‘ routine 
operational matters is viewed as meddling which undermines public service‘s morale. At the 
same time, all must work within an accountability system in place to ensure that the decisions 
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are carried out and performance is rewarded or punished appropriately.
3
 Similarly it is also 
important for the political executive to state their position on policy issues and express 
support for the officials implementing their policies. But their interventions in routine 
implementation need to be strategic and to avoid perceptions of ad hoc meddling, which 
undermines public managers‘ morale and saps their operational capacity. Public managers, on 
the other hand, need to remember that their task is to carry out their minister‘s priorities and 
decisions neutrally and professionally.  
Communication with stakeholders and the general public is essential for policy and 
governance effectiveness because it enhances awareness, understanding, and support for 
government policies. Skillful communication can increase support for government‘s policy 
objectives and make the task of governance easier and more effective (CommGAP, 2009).To 
succeed, governments need to define the issue and draw the public into focussing on it and 
actively contributing to its resolution (Post, Salmon and Raile, 2008). Without 
communication structures and processes which enable the two-way exchange of information 
between state and citizens, it is difficult to imagine how states can be responsive to public 
needs and expectations. Crucially, two-way communication allow citizens to monitor the 
states‘ activities, to enter into dialogue with the state on issues that matter to them, and to 
influence political outcomes.‖ [http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/communication-and-
governance/the-role-of-communication-in-governance-and-development]. Strategies and 
tools for two-way communication with the public include ―public interest lobbying, 
facilitating networks among like-minded political elites, building coalitions, and measuring 
and informing public opinion‖ (Haider, Mcloughlin and Scott 2011). 
At the system level, a significant aspect of policy capacity is (9) “political-economic 
capacity”. This extends beyond the wealth and resources a jurisdiction has to the presence of 
legitimacy and trust in government on the part of stakeholders and the public. Two-way 
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communication with citizens is a complex web of ―interlocking structures, processes, and 
practices‖(World Bank 2011). For meaningful two-way communication to occur, 
governments need to create a public space where citizens can discuss and debate issues that 
matter to them with the aim to influencing policymakers. Public discussion and debate in the 
policy process helps to increase public awareness of the issues and provides a sense of 
ownership of reform. This requires an active civil society, an independent media, and 
freedom of speech and assembly (Haider, Mcloughlin and Scott 2011). Freedom of 
information or right to information is increasingly viewed as an essential precondition for 
citizens to participate in the policy process. 
The nine elements of capacity in this schema are set out in Figure 5 below. 
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Source: Modeled after Wu et al 2010 and Tiernan and Wanna 2006 
 
 18 
Critical Capacity Deficits and Their Links to Governance Failures: The Achilles Heel of 
a Governance Mode 
 
In recent years, as pointed out above, the default reform often adopted in practice by 
government seeking to improve upon hierarchical governance is to turn to a market or 
network mode of governance. In contrast to networks, the adoption of market governance 
arrangements, in at least their simplest form, is relatively easy because all the government has 
to do is reduce its involvement in the provision of goods and services in question with the 
expectation that the market would fill the void. In all likelihood, however, the resulting 
market will be both inefficient and inequitable due to the deep market failures that 
characterize many sectors and activities and prevent markets from functioning efficiently or 
effectively (Weimer and Vining 2009).  
That is, in order to function effectively markets require tough but sensible regulations 
that are diligently implemented, conditions that are difficult to meet for most governments 
due to lack of analytical, managerial, and/or political competences or capabilities. Without 
adequate capacity to regulate the sector, governments may turn to subsidizing users and 
particularly providers. While such subsidies can improve access and may be politically 
expedient, they are vulnerable to explosion in costs that will undermine the long-term 
viability of the regulatory system.  
In such circumstances hierarchical governance need not be as dysfunctional as 
stylized descriptions by proponents of market and network governance may suggest and, in 
fact, may be superior to the alternatives (Hill and Lynn 2005; Peters 2004). A health care 
system characterized by government provision and financing supplemented by capped 
payment, for example, is an effective means of delivering health care at affordable cost (Li et 
al 2007). There are of course inherent limitations to command and control, the adverse effects 
of which may be contained through offsetting measures in some instances. Thus, market 
competition in standardized services or when consumer preferences are diverse  may improve 
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efficiency without compromising access. Similarly, network governance may perform well 
when dealing with sensitive issues such as aspects of health or education when trust and 
understanding is paramount (Pestoff et al 2012). In other instances civil society may not be 
well enough constructed or resourced to be able to create beneficial network forms of 
governance (Tunzelmann 2010). 
‗Governance failures‘ is a new term in the literature, which is a useful way to describe 
these situations, and others, which occur when the requisites of a governance mode are not 
met or, to put it another way, when the capacity of a mode is outstripped by the need for 
policy action. It joins the policy studies lexicon along with terms such as ‗government 
failures‘, ‗market failures‘ and the much less known ―network failures‖ described above (Le 
Grand 1991, Wolf Jr 1987, Weimer and Vining 2011; Weiner and Alexander 1998, Provan 
and Kenis 2008; Tunzelmann 2010; Uribe, 2012). 
The three main types of governance failures and their relationship to capacity gaps are 
summarized in Figure 6 below. 
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In general, governments would like to enjoy high levels of capability and competence 
in all aspects of capacity in order to enjoy high capacity to perform their policy functions. 
Shortcomings in one or a few of the dimensions may be offsets by strengths along other 
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dimensions but no government can expect to be capable if lagging along many dimensions 
(Tiernan and Wanna 2006). 
Some shortfalls in capacity are especially critical in specific modes of governance, 
however, and constitute the ‗achilles heel‖ of each of the four main modes of public 
governance set out in Figure 2.  
Menahem and Stein (2013) have outlined some of the critical capacity issues in the 
case of network governance relations, identifying the capacity pre-conditions for high, 
medium and low performing network governance relationships (see Figure 7 below).  
 
Figure 7 – Capacity Links to Network Governance Requirements after Menahem and 
Stein 
Source: Menahem and Stein 2013 
 
Networks will fail when governments encounter  capability problems at the 
organizational level such as a lack of societal leadership, poor associational structures and 
weak state steering capacities which make adoption of network governance modes 
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differences between networks operating in various localities. Some scholars argue that
private actors’ interests may gain primacy within these highly decentralized arrangements
at the local level; others assert that public actors retain primacy in the new arrangements
(Taylor 2000; Stoker 2004; Geddes 2005; Davies 2007; Whitehead 2007). This makes local
government a very suitable context for examining the central concerns of this study, both
because such collaborations have become more salient at this level of government and
because the potential variance in the networks can reveal the beneﬁts of the suggested
typology.
ANALYTICAL APPROACH ANDMETHODOLOGY
The research was designed to expose both the objective dimensions of the networks’
operation and outcomes and the interpretative subjective dimension of the meanings
attributed to the collaboration by the actors. This objective is in accord with the fact
that collaborations have both formal institutional facets and interactive aspects that are
negotiated by partners.
Six medium-sized towns were chosen for study on the basis of the socioeconomic rank
assigned them by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2003), ranging from 2 to 9 on
a scale of 1 to 10. Rank 3 was not sampled because of a lack of such towns near the
centre of the country, where all the other towns are located. Rank 6 was initially included
but yielded very partial data from interviewees and was, eventually, dropped from this
account.
Because the need for welfare services correlates strongly (though not fully) with
socioeconomic strata, we chose this formal ranking as a guideline for town sampling.
Furthermore, since our study is among the ﬁrst in Israel to focus on collaborations for
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problematic. As Keast, Mandell and Brown (2006) note, at the level of competences, 
networks also raise severe managerial challenges: ―Networks often lack the accountability 
mechanisms available to the state, they are difficult to steer or control, they are difficult to get 
agreements on outcomes and actions to be taken, and they can be difficult to understand and 
determine who is in charge‖. A recurrent problem faced by efforts to utilize network 
governance is that the routines, trust, and reciprocity which characterize successful network 
management (cf Klijn and Koppenjan 2012) take a long time to emerge. Such relationships 
cannot simply be established by fiat as in the case with hierarchy or emerge spontaneously in 
response to forces of demand and supply, as in markets. Networks are thus hard to establish 
where none exist already and a very critical capacity issue for them is ―managerial expertise 
capacity‖.  
Legal systems of governance similarly also require high level of managerial skills in 
order to avoid diminishing returns with compliance or growing non-compliance with 
government rules and regulations (May 2005). Thus for example, while there have been 
advances in identifying the key traits of effective manager, little is known about how to train 
managers to be effective leaders and this is especially crucial in hierarchical modes of 
government featuring direct government direction and control.  
Downfalls in system level capabilities are also crucial in this mode of governance. 
Recruiting and retaining leaders is somewhat difficult for the public sector for a variety of 
reasons (British Cabinet Office, 2001). The cumbersome accountability mechanisms in place 
in the public sector promote risk aversion, whereas risk-taking is an essential trait of leaders. 
The culture of blame for failures is another factor that stymies leadership in the public sector 
(Hood 2010). The unclear division of responsibilities between elected and appointed officials 
also makes it difficult for the latter to exercise leadership. These barriers need to be 
comprehended and addressed if leadership is to improve and this element of policy capacity 
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enhanced. Thus for legal modes of governance a critical capacity issue is accountability and 
responsibility system capacity (Aucoin 1997). 
 For corporatist regimes, the importance of efficient administrative structures and 
processes and the vital importance of coordination therein, cannot be overstated. Inspired by 
conceptions of chain of command in the military, corporatist regimes stress hierarchy, 
discipline, due process, and clear lines of accountability. Unlike markets where prices 
seamlessly perform coordination functions, this must be actively promoted in corporatist 
forms of government and combined with political skills in understanding stakeholder needs 
and positions (Berger 1981; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982). At the level of capabilities, 
corporatist modes of governance require a great deal of coherence and coordination to 
function effectively due to horizontal divisions and numerous hierarchical layers found in 
their bureaucratic structures (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Wilensky and Turner 1987). 
Hence for such this mode of governance ―organizational political capacity‖ is critical and a 
sine qua non of its successful performance. 
As for market governance, as already mentioned above, technical knowledge is a 
critical competence required for its administration. Analytical skills at the level of individual 
analysts and policy workers are key here and the ―policy analytical capacity‖ of government 
needs to be especially high to deal with complex quantitative economic and financial issues 
involved in regulating and steering the sector and preventing crises (Rayner et al 2013).
4
  
Each of these gaps highlights the need for adequate capacity in these critical areas if a 
governance system to achieve its potential. Specific governance modes are prone to specific 
types of failure caused by specific capacity shortages in critical areas required for that mode 
to function. Re-visiting the nine components of capacity set out Figure 5 above, the ‗critical‘ 
capacity element in each mode is set out in Figure 8 below.  
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Conclusion: Policy Capacity Deficits and Governance Performance 
Practical experience and ideological predilections have shaped the substance of much 
of the debate on governance, ranging from preferences for democracy, popular participation 
and consensus to concerns about budget deficits and public sector inefficiencies in hierarchy-
based systems which have often driven preferences for the use of network and market forms 
of governance. These conditions have fostered a strong preference for shifts towards non-
legal governance modes in many countries in recent years, with countries in the Anglo-
American tradition usually preferring market forms of governance while others with more 
corporatist traditions often displaying a penchant for corporatist and networks hybrids 
(Meuleman 2009). 
Lost in the pursuit of these ideologically preferred alternatives, however, is the 
understanding of whether or not a preferred governance mode can actually address a 
particular sector‘s problems. Instead of analyzing and understanding the specifics of the 
sector in question, the protagonists often simply extrapolate from idealized conceptions of 
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how non-hierarchical modes of governance might work in practice and then apply them 
across sectors regardless of the contexts in which they are being applied and the capacity pre-
requisites of the mode of governance in question.  
While some policy-makers may find the proclaimed superiority of the market and/or 
network alternatives convenient because it allows them to shed responsibility for difficult 
problems, thus reducing the scope for criticism of their performance, as the discussion above 
has shown all governance modes have Achilles heels, that is, areas in which they require a 
high level of policy capacity in order to perform well. If these critical capacity deficits are not 
taken into account then any short-term gain enjoyed by politicians pandering to contemporary 
political preferences are likely to be offset later when the consequences of governance 
failures and poor institutional design become apparent (Hood 2010, Weaver 1986). 
Given that all governance modes are vulnerable to specific kinds of failures due to 
these inherent vulnerabilities, when governments reform or try to shift from one mode to the 
other modes, they need to understand : (1) the nature of the problem they are trying to address 
and the skills and resources they have at their disposal to address it, (2) the innate features of 
the different governances modes and the capabilities and competences each requires in order 
to operate at a high level of performance. 
 
Endnotes
                                                     
1
 This claim is no more than an article of faith as there is little evidence supporting it and a lot of evidence 
contradicting this thesis (see Adger & Jordan, 2009; Howlett, Rayner and Tollefson 2009, Hysing, 2009; Kjær, 
2004; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). It is entirely possible that network governance combines and 
indeed compounds the ill-effects of both governments and markets rather than improve upon them and this is a 
subject area requiring further empirical examination (Tunzelmann 2010). Regardless of the inconclusive 
intellectual debate on the subject, however, as a result of this layering of reform efforts many policy sectors in 
many countries are now ‗hybrids‘ of ‗metagovernance‘ styles (Meuleman 2010). 
2
 Contemporary conceptions of leadership sees it less as related to charisma and more about coordinating group 
dynamics. As a British Cabinet Office (2001) report observed, ―Research suggests that creating the appropriate 
climate within a team can account for approximately 30% of the variation in its performance and that the leader 
has a critical influence on this climate. About 70% of organisational climate is influenced by the styles (or 
consistent patterns of behaviour) a leader deploys in relating to others within the team.‖ Groups exist in all 
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organizations at all levels and they function best when there is a commonly defined purpose and roles and 
expectations are broadly shared by members. 
3 Another vital function of the minister is to publicly defend the bureaucracy against possible criticisms when it 
is merely carrying out the government‘s policies. In the real world of public policy, the line between making and 
implementing policy is thin and porous as both are involved in different capacities in the entire policy process. 
Yet a defined operational space for each needs to be delineated and accepted. 
4 As early as 1999 the UK Cabinet Office (1999) recommended appointment of ―policy researchers‖ in 
government agencies, establishment of ―Centre for Evidence- Based Policy‖, and promotion of ―knowledge 
networks‖ to gather, analyze and disseminate policy evidence. It further recommended enhanced training in 
public policy analysis for both political and bureaucratic officials. However, there is a shortage of people with 
the required analytical skills in public policy and administration who may be appointed. The recent proliferation 
of Master‘s programs in public policy and public administration is a welcome trend, but it will be a long time 
before these graduates will be significant in number to make a make a noticeable difference to the analytical 
capacity of governments. 
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